Survival and Air-sea Rescue in North Sea Oil Operations In spite of safety regulations and the use of specialized safety equipment, accidents occur at intervals in almost all industrial situations. In the field of offshore oil exploration and exploitation there is no reason to believe that the problem will be less acute. Prevention of accidents is, of course, the major object of those responsible for safety, but the problem of recovery of those who, for one reason or another, have the misfortune to be involved in an accident must also be examined. My comments are restricted to the discussion of the problems of survival and rescue of individuals who fall into the sea from or near the oil rig, and the factors involved in survival following a helicopter ditching.
Various types of platform are in use at present in the North Sea, including semi-immersible exploration rigs, drilling ships and permanent production platforms. The heights of platforms on different rigs may vary considerably, but 15-30 metres above the sea is common. Impact with the water from these heights is likely to produce injury unless the individual enters the water cleanly, feet first. In many cases the victim will be incapable of carrying out any positive action to help himself after water entry. His survival therefore depends on the provision of buoyancy, to protect him from drowning, and rescue, before he dies from cold.
For the victim to have a reasonable chance of survival one must assume that the alarm is raised when he falls into the water and that the safety ship or supply vessel standing by the rig acts quickly.
The emergency drill for man overboard on the rig is as follows: (1) Ring the alarm bell. (2) Toss a life ring to the man in the water. (3) Mark his position with light and smoke floats. (4) Call in the standby vessel. (5) Launch the rig's emergency boat if the weather permits (wind force 6 or less). Practice drills using a dummy are carried out regularly but the safety vessel is usually a mile or two away from the rig and it is not easy to spot a man in the water even in good conditions in daylight. Knowledge of wind direction and tidal flow past the rig at the time enables a reasonably accurate estimate of the position of the victim to be made. As only his head and life-jacket, if worn, are likely to be above the surface the target is small. At night the problem is intensified and the chances of successful rescue are greatly A life-jacket of the permanent buoyancy type is bulky and frequently uncomfortable. Although these are issued to each man they are not always worn. It is suggested that a life-jacket of the automatic inflation type might be more acceptable (Fig 1) . These are light and compact, and would not impede the wearer during normal work. The outer cover provides protection from contamination and from water impact. On immersion the automatic operating head is water activated and the life-jacket inflates. Rain or spray is not sufficient to activate the system.
When inflated a jacket of this type, which meets the performance requirements of the British Standard BS 3595/69, will turn the wearer face upwards in the water and support him satisfactorily. In rough sea conditions spray is blown off the surface of the water and in some cases waves may wash over the face of the survivor making it necessary for him to time his breathing to avoid inhalation of water. Use of a face screen or hood on the life-jacket would enable him to breathe without restriction. Many life-jackets in use in the Royal Navy are now fitted with this device for additional protection (Fig 1) .
The orange colour of the hood aids location. The hood itself can also provide an alternative mounting point for the light; it is permanently attached to the collar of the life-jacket and is held in position by velcro patches. Although no measurements have yet been made the hood also provides a degree of thermal protection by reducing heat loss from the head; In a combination of wind and spray this could possibly result in a significant increase in survival time.
The water temperature in the northern North Sea remains for most of the year in the region of 5-10°C. Only in late summer is 10°C likely to be exceeded. The men on the oil rig wear only coveralls in summer, while in winter they also wear insulated underwear. The amount of clothing makes a considerable difference to survival time. A man who falls into the water in early summer may therefore be in a worse position then he would be if the accident had happened in November.
The expected survival time of subjects in heavy clothing is approximately twice that of nude subjects, while a further improvement can be achieved by the use of a 'dry' survival suit worn over appropriate clothing. In water at 7°C, which is typical of the region, a lightly clad subject can be expected to survive for 40 minutes. With heavy clothing the time is doubled and with the use of an immersion suit it may be possible to survive for several hours.
A 'dry' survival suit such as the naval 'Once Only' Survival Suit or the Aircrew Immersion Suit not only provides thermal protection; it permits the wearer to move freely in the water without being subjected to the intense discomfort caused by cold water flowing in and out of the clothing. He is therefore more able to help himself and more willing to help others.
Comments have often been made about the horizontal flotation angle resulting from the buoyancy in the legs of the survival suit. Trials in the wave tank at the Admiralty Experiment Works, Haslar, have shown that this is beneficial as the subject floats over the waves more easily while wearing the suit than without it.
Transfer of personnel between land and the rigs is carried out mainly by helicopter. British Airways and Bristows provide this service from their bases at Dyce near Aberdeen, and at Sumburgh in the Shetlands. The helicopters serving the Natural Gas Fields in the South operate from Yarmouth. Both firms use S61 and S58 helicopters which fly with either 1 or 2 crew and can carry up to 22 passengers. If an emergency occurs involving loss of power in one engine the helicopter can make a controlled landing on the water. With its boat-shaped hull, it is claimed that the S61 can float upright and ride to a sea anchor in waves up to 15 ft (5 m) high provided that they are not too steep. The S58, which is smaller, is provided with inflatable buoyancy bags which should support it satisfactorily.
Ideally, therefore, it should be possible to launch the life-raft and board it without getting wet. Life-jackets are provided and if a successful water landing is achieved the passengers should have time to put them on, remembering not to inflate them until they are clear of the helicopter. In the S58 the pilot has no direct access to the cabin and must climb down the outside of the aircraft, open the cabin door and enter in order to extract the life-raft.
Conditions are seldom perfect and a rough sea or rupture of a buoyancy bag could result in inversion of the helicopter and rapid flooding of the cabin. The occupants would then be faced with the problems of escaping from the craft under water. Many oil company employees have been given practical instruction in the techniques of underwater escape in the RN training device at HMS Vernon.
Some companies now insist that their employees wear protective clothing to increase survival time in the water. The prime survival aid is, however, the life-raft. This is stowed beside an emergency exit at the aft end of the cabin in the S61. Its weight is about 130 lb (59 kg) and it has to be dragged to the door and launched. If the helicopter does invert, who will go back inside it to extract the life-raft after they have completed a successful under water escape? After extraction from the cabin the life-raft must be inflated and boarded by the survivors and then a series of actions must be taken to make the raft secure:
(1) Cut the painter connecting the raft to the aircraft. (2) Deploy the drogue to stabilize the raft. (3) Close the doors and inflate the floor to reduce loss of heat. (4) Ensure that all survivors take anti-seasick pills. (5) Find the flares and ensure that other location aids are ready for use.
(It should not be forgotten that the life-raft itself is a valuable location aid.)
If the raft inflates upside down or capsizes only the crew members will know how to right it. Regular life-raft drills are essential and it is important that crew members wear immersion suits to enable them to work efficiently in the water. Without adequate protection they may be unable to carry out the necessary actions and to assist passengers if required.
Once inside the raft the occupants should be safe. Water and food are less important in the North Sea than in the major oceans because rescue operations should commence with the minimum delay. The need for maximum pro-tection, however, cannot be over-emphasized and the danger of under-estimating the time which the survivors will have to spend in the life-raft is well illustrated by the Lovat incident in which the crew made little attempt to improve the situation while awaiting rescue and only 2 of the 11 crew members who boarded the raft survived.
In the Northern Sector, Search and Rescue (SAR) cover is provided by British Airways based at Dyce under contract to the Department of Trade and Industry. Although the S61s are not fitted with winches they do have the appropriate attachment lugs. In the SAR section a trolley carrying a portable winch and all other necessary equipment is kept ready to equip the first available helicopter. The winch is stowed inside at the forward end of the cabin and can be extended through the starboard forward door when required. In addition to the pilots, two crew are carried, one to operate the winch and one to be lowered to assist the survivors.
It must be remembered that the British Airways contract is for one SAR aircraft at one hour notice and its task is to provide SAR cover for shipping. As the accident may take place at a range of 150 miles or more from base, the flight to the scene of the accident could take a further two hours. Search of the area would then start and its success would depend on the location aids available and the accuracy of the last recorded position of the ditched helicopter. The SAR aircraft has a radius of action of 170 miles but this can be extended by refuelling at an oil rig en route. Survivors could be taken to a nearby rig initially if the aircraft is operating close to its limits of endurance. In many cases due to prevailing wind it is preferable to continue east to a base in Norway rather than to return to Scotland against a strong headwind. RN Seakings operating from HMS Gannet (Prestwick) and RAF Nimrods from Kinloss would of course assist in Search and Rescue operations if called upon by the Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Pitreavie Castle, Inverkeithing, near Edinburgh.
Conclusion
(1) Protection from the elements, and particularly from the effects of immersion in cold water, is essential if rescue is not immediately available.
(2) Rescue usually takes longer than expected.
(3) Crew and passengers of helicopters flying over the North Sea should be provided with protective clothing, preferably of the dry-suit type, when the water temperature is below 1 5°C. (4) Consideration should be given to the possibility of providing external stowage or at least external access to the life-rafts carried by the helicopters. 
Some Occupational Hazards of Diving
Diving is considered to be a high-risk occupation: for instance there are said to have been some 26 deaths in the North Sea population of around 1000 divers during the last 4-5 years (Warner 1976, personal communication) . A detailed analysis of these accidents must await completion of legal proceedings but it would seem that the majority were due to some failure of equipment or diving procedure. Only 2 were reputed to be due to decompression sickness and in 3 there was some underlying medical condition, not necessarily detectable at routine examination, which may have determined the fatal outcome. In several fatalities, however, the primary cause and contributory factors remain uncertain.
It is an objective of this paper to review the hazards to which divers are exposed while at work. Not all accidents have a fatal outcome and, besides the 'near-misses' who may be fit to resume work almost immediately, there are those incidents that leave some residual injury, most commonly a neurological deficit following decompression sickness. Additionally, there are those insidious occupational illnesses to which divers are exposed, the best-known example being aseptic necrosis of the subchondral bone of the head of the humerus and femur.
The hazards due to diving equipment failure and procedural inadequacies are largely beyond the reach of preventive medicine, even though the final outcome may be death by drowning. Nevertheless, there are many circumstances in diving when the possible reduction of hazard is primarily the responsibility of medical practitioners and physiologists. Such risks may rise from the direct effect of pressure upon the body or from the effect of the increased partial pressures of respired gases. These effects may be divided conveniently into those associated with the compression phase, those which are most commonly experienced while at maximum pressure and those which appear as a consequence of the subsequent decompression to normal atmospheric pressure.
Compression Phase
It is well understood that the air-containing spaces of the body are subject to Boyle's law while the tissues of the body are virtually incompressible. Failure to 'clear the ears' during descent can lead to otitic barotrauma and, if severe, a serosanguinous transudate in the middle ear or rupture of the tympanic membrane. Even
